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Abstract
We provide new axiomatic characterizations of the proportional Shapley value, a weighted
value with the worths of the singletons as weights. This value satisfies anonymity and
therefore symmetry just as the Shapley value and has characterizations which are pro-
portional counterparts to the famous characterizations of the Shapley value in Shapley
(1953b), Myerson (1980) and Young (1985a). If the stand alone worths are plausible
weights the proportional Shapley value is a convincing alternative to the Shapley value
for example in cost allocation. We introduce two new axioms, called proportionality and
player splitting respectively. Each of which gives a main difference between the propor-
tional Shapley value and the Shapley value.
Keywords Cost allocation · Dividends · Proportional Shapley value · (Weighted)
Shapley value · Proportionality · Player splitting
1. Introduction
In contrast to Thomas (1969, 1974), who assert that all cost allocation methods are arbi-
trary and no one allocation scheme can be defended against all others, we have on the one
hand a large group of economists which prefers traditional cost accounting practices on
the other hand a small group which prefers cost allocation based on solutions to coopera-
tive games with transferable utility dominated by the Shapley value, e. g. Shubik (1962),
Spinetto (1975), Roth and Verrecchia (1979), Young (1985a), Young (1985b) and Leng
and Parlar (2009). Moriarity (1975) states
”A proposal for a new allocation procedure can be justified only on the basis
of the advantages of the proposed method over existing methods.”
An empirical study in Barton (1988) shows a dramatic preference for the proportional
solution, called Moriarity’s method (Moriarity 1975), also known as proportional rule,
compared to the nucleolus or the Shapley value. Banker (1981) use an axiomatic approach.
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2He worked out some shortcomings of the Shapley Value in cost allocation, especially the
additivity axiom is considered questionable. It makes the allocation sensitive to the way
cost centres are used or organized. Banker shows in an example that the allocations can
differ significantly if two cost centres are merged and considered as a single entry. His
own proposal for an axiomatization for cost allocation contains a splitting axiom instead
of additivity. It turns out that the unique value of his axiomatization is identical with
the proportional rule (Moriarity 1975).
In contrast there are some other authors who stress the disadvantages of the propor-
tional rule and suggest the Shapley value. For example, in Amer et al. (2007) is criticized
the restricted domain of the proportional rule, the lack of additivity, a doubly discrimi-
natory level and that it does not take into account most of the marginal contributions.
The last point of criticism is avoided by the proper Shapley values (Brink et al. 2015) or
the proportional value, developed by Ortmann (2000) respectively Feldman (1999) simul-
taneously. Feldman also suggests his value to cost allocation and gives a short overview
over proportional cost allocation and pointed to Gangolly (1981). Gangolly introduced
there a new cost allocation scheme, denoted as ”Independent Cost Proportional Scheme
(ICPS)”. He used in this scheme for each given coalition function v a (proportional)
weighted Shapley value, where the weights are the worths of the singletons v({i}) for ev-
ery player i. Yet a general formalisation as a TU-value and an axiomatic characterization
was still missing. Independently there was a ”rediscovery” of this value by Besner (2016)
and Be´al et al. (2017). Both denote their non linear TU-value ”proportional Shapley
value” and give an axiomatization in spirit to the axiomatization of the weighted Shapley
values with weighted balanced contributions (Myerson 1980; Hart and Mas-Colell 1989)
and point out that the proportional Shapley value inherits many of the properties of the
weighted Shapley values. In Besner (2016) there are some extensions of the proportional
Shapley value, for example to graphs and level structures. Be´al et al. (2017) introduce a
potential and give some comparable axiomatizations to the Shapley value and economic
applications.
The aim of this paper is to establish the proportional Shapley value as an application-
relevant allocation scheme, where there are asymmetries that are included exclusively
in the underlying game and not in exogenous weights. So this value is symmetric and
has many analog axiomatizations to the Shapley value. Two new axioms give a main
difference to the Shapley value. The first, proportionality, is an proportional counterpart
to symmetry: The payoffs to two weakly dependent players, that means the marginal
contributions of one of these players to any coalition which contains only one of both
players, is only his singleton worth, are proportional to the singleton worths of each
other. Nowak and Radzik (1995) give a similar axiom, called ω-mutual dependence, for
the weighted Shapley values. By the second axiom, player splitting, related to Banker
(1981), where a player is splitted into two new players, the payoff to unconcerned players
does not change. In Radzik (2012) is a similar idea in the opposite direction for the
weighted Shapley values by his amalgamating payoffs axiom where players who build a
partnership (Kalai and Samet 1987) amalgamate to a new player.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains some preliminaries. In section 3 we
give an motivating example and show there is a inconsistency of the Shapley value in this
case. Section 4 presents a short overview of known and simple results for the proportional
Shapley value. As the main result we give in section 5 axiomatizations, which are close
3to Shapley’s original Shapley (1953b) and to Young (1985a). Section 6 gives a short
conclusion. An appendix (section 7) provides all the proofs, some related lemmas and
shows logical independence of the axioms used for characterization.
2. Preliminaries
We denote by R the real numbers, by Q++ all positive rational numbers and by RN++ =
{x ∈ RN : xi > 0 for all i ∈ N} the set of all vectors x ∈ RN where all coordinates xi are
positive. Let U a infinite set, the universe of all players, and denote byN the set of all finite
subsets of U. A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU-game) is a pair (N, v)
consisting of a set of playersN ∈ N and a coalition function v ∈ {f : 2N → R|f(∅) = 0},
where 2N is the power set of N . We refer to a TU-game also only by v. The subsets S ⊆ N
are called coalitions and v(S) is called the worth of coalition S.
The set of all TU-games with player set N is denoted by GN and the set of all TU-
games on N where the worths of all singletons are all positive by GN0 = {v ∈ GN: v({i}) >
0 for all i ∈ N}. If the worths of the singletons can only be all positive rational we mark
this set by GN0Q = {v ∈ GN: v({i}) ∈ Q++ for all i ∈ N}.
A TU-value on GN (respectively on subdomains of GN) is an operator ϕ, which assigns
any v ∈ GN (respectively v is an element of a subdomain of GN) a payoff vector ϕ(N, v) ∈
RN or short ϕ(v) for all N ∈ N , with the meaning that ϕi(v) is the payoff to player i in
the TU-game v.
Let N ∈ N , v ∈ GN and S ⊆ N . We denote by (S, v) the restriction of (N, v) to the
player set S. The Harsanyi dividends ∆v(S) (Harsanyi 1959) are defined inductively
by
∆v(S) =
{
v(S)−∑R(S ∆v(R) if |S| ≥ 1, and
0 if S = ∅. (1)
Another well-known formula of the dividends is given for all S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅, by
∆v(S) =
∑
R⊆S
(−1)|S|−|R|v(R). (2)
The marginal contribution MCvi (S) of player i ∈ N to S ⊆ N\{i} is given by
MCvi (S) := v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S). We call a coalition S ⊆ N active in v if ∆v(S) 6= 0.
Player i ∈ N is a dummy player if v(S ∪{i}) = v(S) + v({i}), i /∈ S, S ⊆ N, or, equiv-
alent as a well-known fact, if ∆v(S ∪ {i}) = 0 for all S ⊆ N\{i}, S 6= ∅. If in addition
v({i}) = 0 then i is called a null player; players i, j ∈ N are called symmetric in v, if
v(S∪{i}) = v(S∪{j}), or, equivalent also as a well-known fact, ∆v(S∪{i}) = ∆v(S∪{j}),
for all coalitions S ⊆ N\{i, j}.
In many applications the assumption of symmetry of the players is not realistic, e. g. if
the bargaining power or the amount of used venture capital are different. Shapley (1953a)
introduced for this case the (positive) weighted Shapley values1: For all N ∈ N , v ∈ GN
1We desist from possibly null weights as in Shapley (1953a) or Kalai and Samet (1987).
4and a vector ω ∈ RN++ of positive weights ωi for all i ∈ N , the (positively) weighted
Shapley Value Shω (Shapley 1953a) is defined by
Shωi (v) =
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
ωi∑
j∈S ωj
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N.
The next value distributes the dividends equally among all players in a coalition: For all
N ∈ N , v ∈ GN, the Shapley value Sh (Shapley 1953b) is defined by
Shi(v) =
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
∆v(S)
|S| for all i ∈ N.
We see that the Shapley value is a weighted Shapley value where all weights are equal. Our
following value distributes the dividends proportionally to the singleton worths among all
players in a coalition: For all N ∈ N , v ∈ GN0 2 the proportional Shapley Value Shp
(Besner 2016; Be´al et al. 2017; Gangolly 1981) is given by
Shpi (v) =
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
v({i})∑
j∈S v({j})
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N (3)
and coincides therefore with the Shapley value if all singletons have the same worth.
We refer to the following standard axioms:
Efficiency, E. For all N ∈ N , v ∈ GN, we have ∑i∈N ϕi(v) = v(N).
Null player. For all N ∈ N , v ∈ GN and i ∈ N such that i is a null player in v, we have
ϕi(v) = 0.
Dummy, D. For all N ∈ N , v ∈ GN and i ∈ N such that i is a dummy player in v, we
have ϕi(v) = v({i}).
Homogeneity, H (of degree 1). For all N ∈ N , v ∈ GN, i ∈ N and scalars α ∈ R, we
have ϕi(αv) = αϕi(v).
Marginality, M. For all N ∈ N , v, v′ ∈ GN and i ∈ N such that MCvi (S) = MCv′i (S)
for all S ⊆ N\{i}, we have ϕi(v) = ϕi(v′).
Monotonicity (with respect to the grand coalition). For all N ∈ N , v, v′ ∈ GN and
i ∈ N such that
v(S)
{
= v′(S), for S ( N,
≥ v′(S), for S = N,
we have ϕi(v) ≥ ϕi(v′).
Additivity, A. For all N ∈ N , v, v′ ∈ GN, we have ϕi(v) + ϕi(v′) = ϕi(v + v′).
Anonymity, AN. For all N ∈ N , v ∈ GN, i ∈ N and all bijections pi: N → N , where
vpi ∈ GN is defined by vpi(S) = v ◦pi−1(S) for all S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅, we have ϕpi(i)(vpi) = ϕi(v).
2Be´al et al. (2017) also allow v({i}) < 0 for all i ∈ N . In accordance with the weights used in the weighted
Shapley values we desist from this possibility.
5Symmetry, S. For all N ∈ N , v ∈ GN, i, j ∈ N such that i and j are symmetric in v,
we have ϕi(v) = ϕj(v).
Balanced contributions. For all N ∈ N , v ∈ GN and for all S ⊆ N , i, j ∈ S, i 6= j, we
have
ϕi(S, v)− ϕi(S\{j}, v) = ϕj(S, v)− ϕj(S\{i}, v).
Weighted balanced contributions, WBC. For all N ∈ N , v ∈ GN and for all S ⊆ N ,
i, j ∈ S, i 6= j, and a vector ω ∈ RN++ with positive weights ωi for all i ∈ N , we have
ϕi(S, v)− ϕi(S\{j}, v)
ωi
=
ϕj(S, v)− ϕj(S\{i}, v)
ωj
.
3. Example
3.1. Situation 1
Assume that three districts of a city, district A, B and C, wish to get a motorway ring.
In figure 1 the lengths of the motorway sections are given in kilometres. The offer of the
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Figure 1: City with three districts and a motorway ring (lengths in km).
road-building company with the most favourable prices is given by
p(`) =

100`, for 0 ≤ ` < 20,
100`− 100, for 20 ≤ ` < 32,
100`− 200, for 32 ≤ `,
where ` is the length in kilometres and the prices are given in millions monetary units.
To share the building costs we can establish a cost game v on N = {1, 2, 3} with players
1 := A, 2 := B , 3 := C, where the worth of a coalition S ⊆ N is the cost of the coalition
6S (in millions monetary units). We get
v({1}) = 1300, v(2) = 1200, v(3) = 1100,
v({1, 2}) = 2400, v({1, 3}) = 2300, v({2, 3}) = 2200,
v({1, 2, 3}) = 3400.
The three districts have the problem, how to share the costs in the game v.
3.2. Situation 2
We modify our example in situation 1 to situation 2 (figure 2). District C is splitted in
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Figure 2: City with four districts and a motorway ring (lengths in km).
two districts C1 and C2 and we get a new coalition function v
′ on N = {1, 2, 31, 32} with
players 1 := A, 2 := B, 31 := C1, 32 := C2, given by
v′({1}) = 1300, v′(2) = 1200, v′(31) = 500,
v′(32) = 600, v′({1, 2}) = 2400, v′({1, 31}) = 1800,
v′({1, 32}) = 1900, v′({2, 31}) = 1700, v′({2, 32}) = 1800,
v′({31, 32}) = 1100 v′({1, 2, 31}) = 2900, v′({1, 2, 32}) = 3000,
v′({1, 31, 32}) = 2300, v′({2, 31, 32}) = 2200, v′({1, 2, 31, 32}) = 3400.
Here is a special kind of ”dependency” between player 31 and 32:
• The sum of the singleton worths from player 31 and 32 in v′ is equal to the worth of
player 3 in game v.
• The marginal contributions of player 31 or player 32 to any coalition which does not
contain the respective other player are only the singleton worths of this players.
• All coalitions which concludes both players 31 and 32 have the same worth in v′ as
the related coalitions in v which content the player 3.
• Coalitions which are the same in v and v′ have the same worth in v and v′.
7In the sum in this example there is no effect by splitting player 3 into two new players 31
and 32 to the other players. Hence we call a value consistent for splitting in a game v, if
in a corresponding game v′, fulfilling the same conditions as here (we will formulate this
conditions in def. 5.6), the payoff to not splitted players does not change.
We get with the Shapley value in game v
Sh1(v) = 1233.33, Sh2(v) = 1133.33, Sh3(v) = 1033.33
and in game v′
Sh1(v
′) = 1241.67, Sh2(v′) = 1141.67, Sh31(v
′) = 458.33, Sh32(v
′) = 558.33.
The total cost saving of cooperating is in each game 200 millions. District C saves in
game v 66.67 millions (one third of the total saving) and district C1 and district C2 save
together in game v′ 83,34 millions (42% of the total saving), although district C owns
only 31% of the length of the motorway. So there is additional to the inconsistency also
a discriminatory level of players which have a greater share of costs.
On the contrary we get with the proportional Shapley value in game v
Shp1(v) = 1229.94, Sh
p
2(v) = 1133.16, Sh
p
3(v) = 1036.90
and in game v′
Shp1(v
′) = 1229.94, Shp2(v
′) = 1133.16, Shp31(v
′) = 471.32, Shp32(v
′) = 565.58.
District A and B have in both games the same costs and district C saves the same as
districts C1 and C2 together, 32% of the total cost saving, and the proportional Shapley
value is consistent for splitting in our sense, what we will prove in general in section 5.
4. Known and simple results
If we use for each given game v ∈ GN0 weights wi(v) := v({i}) for all i ∈ N , then the
proportional Shapley value Shp is for this coalition function v (and corresponding to its
subgames) identical to the weighted Shapley value Shw(v) and for cost games to the
”Independent Cost Proportional Scheme (ICPS)” (Gangolly 1981). So it is clear (the
proof is immediate and omitted), that well-known results for a fixed coalition function
of a weighted Shapley value hold also for the proportional Shapley value (Besner 2016;
Be´al et al. 2017). E. g. the following properties of the proportional Shapley value are
inherited:
• efficiency, dummy, homogeneity and monotonicity.
A main difference between all weighted Shapley values, with exception of the Shapley
value, and the proportional Shapley value make
• symmetry and anonymity. For the proof, see appendix 7.2.1.
The next axiom is analog to weighted balanced contributions (Myerson 1980).
8Proportional balanced contributions, PBC (Besner 2016; Be´al et al. 2017). For all
N ∈ N , v ∈ GN0 , all S ⊆ N , all players i, j ∈ S, i 6= j, we have
ϕi(S, v)− ϕi(S\{j}, v)
v({i}) =
ϕj(S, v)− ϕj(S\{i}, v)
v({j}) .
In Myerson (1980) is given an axiomatization of the Shapley value by efficiency and
balanced contributions. Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) could show that the values, uniquely
characterized by efficiency and weighted balanced contributions in Myerson (1980), are
the weighted Shapley values. Analogue we have
Theorem 4.1 (Besner 2016; Be´al et al. 2017). Let N ∈ N and v ∈ GN0 . Shp is the
unique TU-Value that satisfies E and PBC.
Be´al et al. (2017) have presented a lot other interesting axioms and axiomatizations, which
are satisfied by the proportional Shapley value, like weak consistency, weak linearity and
admittance of a potential. We don’t use this here and refer to the authors.
5. Axiomatizations
This main part of our paper provides new axioms which are satisfied by the proportional
Shapley value and lead to new axiomatic characterizations. So the proportional Shapley
value has a counterpart not only to the famous characterization of the Shapley value in
Myerson (1980) but also to the classics in Shapley (1953b) and Young (1985a).
In the case of using subdomains, we require an axiom to hold when all games belong to
this subdomain. All proves, related lemmas and the logical independence of the axioms
used for characterization are relegated to the appendix (section 7).
5.1. A characterization similar to Shapley
In our example, situation 3.2, the new splitted players are in a kind of dependency: Each
new player has to all coalitions where the other new player is not a member only a
marginal contribution of his singleton worth. Nowak and Radzik (1995) has used for
axiomatizations of the weighted Shapley values, also in the spirit of Shapley (1953b) and
Young (1985a), an axiom called ω-mutual dependence. There are, in different to our
following definition, the singleton worths of dependent players zero.
Definition 5.1. Players i, j ∈ N are called weakly dependent in v, v ∈ GN, if
v(S ∪ {k}) = v(S) + v({k}), k ∈ {i, j}, for all coalitions S ⊆ N\{i, j}.
This definition has the interpretation that a player is only interested to join a coalition
which contents weakly dependent players, if all weakly dependent players are in the joined
coalition. So all weakly dependent players are in mutually dependency.
Lemma 5.2. Players i, j ∈ N are weakly dependent in v, v ∈ GN, iff ∆v(S ∪ {k}) = 0,
k ∈ {i, j}, for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}, S 6= ∅.
9For the proof, see appendix 7.2.2.
With definition 5.1 for weakly dependent players we get a related axiom to symmetry
which is familiar to ω-mutual dependence in Nowak and Radzik (1995):
Proportionality, P. For all v ∈ GN0 , i, j ∈ N such that i and j are weakly dependent in
v, we have
ϕi(v)
v({i}) =
ϕj(v)
v({j}) .
In Shapley (1953b) are formulated desirable properties for an TU-value by his well-known
three axioms, which can be represented by the four axioms efficiency, null player, symme-
try and additivity, where null player can be replaced by dummy. But it is not appropriate
to claim additivity in the case of a proportional value, because additivity is not even satis-
fied in the two player case (see Ortmann 2000, def. 1.3.). So we use an axiom of additivity
where in each game the stand-alone worths of all players are in the same proportion.
Weak additivity, WA. For all N ∈ N , v, w ∈ GN, w({i}) = c · v({i}) for all i ∈ N ,
c > 0, we have
ϕi(v) + ϕi(w) = ϕi(v + w).
It follows a characterization close to the original in Shapley (1953b).
Theorem 5.3. Let N ∈ N and v ∈ GN0 . Shp is the unique TU-Value that satisfies E, D,
P and WA.
For the proof, see appendix 7.2.3.
5.2. A characterization similar to Young
One of the most elegant characterizations of the Shapley value is suggested by Young
(1985a). In addition to efficiency and symmetry there is used marginality3. To charac-
terize the proportional Shapley value we weaken marginality:
Weak marginality, WM. For all N ∈ N , v, w ∈ GN, w({j}) = v({j}) for all j ∈ N ,
and i ∈ N such that MCvi (S) = MCwi (S) for all S ⊆ N\{i}, we have
ϕi(v) = ϕi(w).
By this axiom, if the stand-alone worths of all players are given, the payoff to a player
depends only on his own marginal contributions. Chun (1989) offers another appealing
axiomatization of the Shapley value, using efficiency, symmetry and coalitional strategic
equivalence, itself a generalization of strategic equivalence from von Neumann and Mor-
genstern (1944). But in Casajus and Huettner (2008) is shown that coalitional strategic
equivalence and marginality are equivalent.
Our next axiom weakens coalitional strategic equivalence.
3Originally Young used an axiom called strong monotonicity. Chun (1989) named the essential part of
this axiom for the proof of the uniqueness marginality.
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Weak coalitional strategic equivalence, WCSE. For all N ∈ N , v, w ∈ GN such
that for any coalition R ⊆ N, |R| ≥ 2, c ∈ R and all coalitions S ⊆ N ,
v(S) =
{
w(S) + c, if S ⊇ R,
w(S), if S + R,
(4)
we have ϕi(v) = ϕi(w) for all i ∈ N\R.
If the members of a coalition R are improving their cooperation and take this improvement
into all supersets of R, the payoff to all non-members of R does not change. Unlike our
axiom, in coalitional strategic equivalence from Chun there are also admitted singletons for
the coalition R, in strategic equivalence from Neumann and Morgenstern only singletons.
We show, analog to Casajus and Huettner (2008):
Proposition 5.4. WM is equivalent to WCSE.
For the proof, see appendix 7.2.4.
Theorem 5.5. Let N ∈ N and v ∈ GN0 . Shp is the unique TU-Value that satisfies E, P
and WM/WCSE (equivalent by proposition 5.4).
For the proof, see appendix 7.2.5.
5.3. Player Splitting
In many applications it is not desired that the payoff to players changes, if another player
splits into several new players, which together have only the same input to the game as
the original splitting player, like in situation 2 (subsection 3.2) in our example. We define
a corresponding game where a player of the original game is ”splitted” in two new players:
Definition 5.6. Let N,N j ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ GN, (N j, vj) ∈ GNj, j ∈ N, k, ` ∈ N j, k, ` /∈
N, N j = (N\{j})∪{k, `}. The game (N j, vj) is called a corresponding splitted player
game to (N, v) if for all S ⊆ N\{j}
• vj({k}) + vj({`}) = v({j}),
• vj(S ∪ {i}) = vj(S) + vj({i}), i ∈ {k, `},
• vj(S ∪ {k, l}) = v(S ∪ {j}) and
• vj(S) = v(S).
It should be observed that players k, ` are weakly dependent in the game vj.
Banker (1981) notes, that an allocation scheme should not be sensitive to the way cost
centres are used or organized. For this kind of games the Shapley value is not the right
choice, because it does not satisfy the following axiom:
Player splitting, PS. For all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ GN, j ∈ N and a corresponding splitted
player game (N j, vj) ∈ GNj to (N, v), we have
ϕi(N, v) = ϕi(N
j, vj) for all i ∈ N\{j}.
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A suitable application of this axiom would be, that a player, who was participating to
an online game full-time, now is participating part-time under cover-names to the game,
where the sum of her time in part-time activities is equal to the original time in full-time
activities. She participates with the same productivity in all original coalitions, but now
under all her cover-names at the same time in total. In all other coalitions she has only
a pro forma membership. This means that her marginal contributions to this coalitions
in each case are only her singleton worths or, more specifically, all part-time players are
weakly dependent. In such a situation the payoff to the other players should not change.
Remark 5.7. Let N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ GN, j ∈ N and (N j, vj) ∈ GNj a corresponding
splitted player game to (N, v). If ϕ is a TU-value that satisfies E and PS, then we have
ϕj(N, v) = ϕk(N
j, vj) + ϕ`(N
j, vj).
This remark is related to the amalgamating payoffs axiom in Radzik (2012) which is there
used to characterize the weighted Shapley values.
Remark 5.8. In def. 5.6 the game (N, v) could also be considered as a corresponding
merged player game to (N j, vj) and so also PS as a player merging axiom. But we
expressly point out that player j ∈ N and players k, ` ∈ N j can be completely independent
apart from the given properties in def. 5.6 unlike amalgamating payoffs in Radzik (2012).
It transpires that splitting fits best with the proportional Shapley value.
Proposition 5.9. Shp satisfies PS.
For the proof, see appendix 7.2.6.
The following lemma shows dependence on symmetry for efficient values which satisfy
player splitting.
Lemma 5.10. Let N ∈ N and v ∈ GN0 . If a TU-Value ϕ satisfies E and PS then ϕ
satisfies also S.
For the proof, see appendix 7.2.7.
We have another interesting lemma which uses lemma 5.10 in the proof.
Lemma 5.11. Let N ∈ N and v ∈ GN0Q. If a TU-Value ϕ satisfies E and PS then ϕ
satisfies also proportionality P.
For the proof, see appendix 7.2.8.
Thus we get if the worths of all singletons are positive rational similar to Young (1985a):
Corollary 5.12. Let N ∈ N and v ∈ GN0Q. Shp is the unique TU-Value that satisfies E,
PS and WM/WCSE (equivalent by proposition 5.4).
The proof follows immediately by proposition 5.9 and lemma 5.11 from theorem 5.5.
We have another characterization with splitting, similar to Shapley (1953b).
Corollary 5.13. Let N ∈ N and v ∈ GN0Q. Shp is the unique TU-Value that satisfies E,
D, PS and WA.
Obviously follows the proof by proposition 5.9 and lemma 5.11 from theorem 5.3.
Remark 5.14. Lemma 5.11 holds for v ∈ GN0 if we require continuity of the TU-value in
v({i}) for all v ∈ GN0 and all i ∈ N in an additional axiom. So also corollary 5.12 and
corollary 5.13 are valid for v ∈ GN0 if there is in each case an additional continuity axiom.
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6. Conclusion
In this paper we have shown, that in games where the stand alone worths of the singletons
are reasonable weights, the proportional Shapley value is a powerful tool to share benefits
of cooperation due to convincing axioms, similar to the Shapley value. It is especially
suitable for games where we don’t want that the payoffs to uninvolved players are chang-
ing, if another player is splitting into two new players which together have the same input
in the game as the single player before. In such games the Shapley value completely fails
and this could be one of the main difficulties, why there is significant resistance to the
use of the Shapley value in cost allocation in practice.
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7. Appendix
7.1. Additional lemmas and a remark, used in the proofs
Remark 7.1. We can consider the collection of all TU-games v ∈ GN, N ∈ N, n := |N |,
as a vector space R2n−1. Each game v is represented by a vector −→v ∈ R2n−1, where the
entries in the 2n−1 coordinates of the 2n−1 coalitions S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅, get the worth v(S) of
the respective coalition S. Hence there exists for every game v a vector
−→
∆v ∈ R2N−1, which
is corresponding to the vector −→v , where the entries of the coordinates get the dividends of
the respective coalitions. By (1) we get with v, v1, v2 ∈ GN
−→
∆v =
−→
∆v1 +
−→
∆v2
⇔ ∆v(S) = ∆v1(S) + ∆v2(S) for all S ⊆ N
⇔ v(S)−
∑
R(S
∆v(R) = v1(S)−
∑
R(S
∆v1(R) + v2(S)−
∑
R(S
∆v2(R) for all S ⊆ N
⇔ v = v1 + v2.
Lemma 7.2. Statement (4) in WCSE can be replaced equivalently by
∆v(S) =
{
∆w(R) + c, if S = R,
∆w(S), otherwise.
Proof. Let the notation and the preconditions as in WCSE. By (2), if v(S) = w(S)
for all S + R, we have ∆v(S) = ∆w(S) for all such S and vice versa. Hence, by (1),
v(R) = w(R) + c is equivalent to ∆v(R) = ∆w(R) + c. By induction on s := |S| we show
now v(S) = w(S) + c ⇔ ∆v(S) = ∆w(S) for all proper supersets S ) R.
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Initialisation: Let S ) R and s = |R|+ 1. R is the only proper subset of S where there
is a difference of the related dividends in both coalition functions and we obtain
v(S) = w(S) + c ⇔
(1)
v(S)−
∑
T(S
∆v(T ) = w(S) + c−
∑
T(S,
T 6=R
∆w(T )− (∆w(R) + c)
⇔
(1)
∆v(S) = ∆w(S).
Induction step: Assume equivalence holds for s′ = s − 1, |R| + 1 ≤ s′ ≤ n − 1 (IH).
Then by (IH) R is again the only proper subset of S with not equal related dividends in
v and w and we get by (1) v(S) = w(S)+c ⇔ ∆v(S) = ∆w(S) as before and lemma 7.2
is shown.
Lemma 7.3 (Casajus and Huettner 2008). If i ∈ N and v, w ∈ GN, then MCvi (S) =
MCwi (S) for all S ⊆ N\{i} iff ∆v(S ∪ {i}) = ∆w(S ∪ {i}) for all S ⊆ N\{i}.
7.2. Proofs
7.2.1. Proof of symmetry/anonymity
It is well-known that AN implies S. We have
Shpi (v) =
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
v({i})∑
j∈S v({j})
∆v(S) =
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
v ◦ pi−1(pi(i))∑
j∈S v ◦ pi−1
(
pi(j)
)∆v◦pi−1(pi(S))
=
∑
pi(S)⊆N,
pi(S)3pi(i)
vpi
(
pi(i)
)∑
pi(j)∈pi(S) vpi
(
pi(j)
)∆vpi(pi(S)) = Shppi(i)(vpi) for all i ∈ N and v ∈ GN0
and so AN and therefore also S is satisfied.
7.2.2. Proof of lemma 5.2
Let i, j ∈ N and v ∈ GN. If S = ∅ we have v(S ∪ {k}) = v(S) + v({k}). We show by
induction on the size s := |S| of all coalitions S ⊆ N\{i, j}, S 6= ∅,
v(S ∪ {k}) = v(S) + v({k}) ⇔ ∆v(S ∪ {k}) = 0.
Initialisation: Let s = 1. For k ∈ {i, j} we have
v(S ∪ {k}) = v(S) + v({k})
⇔
(1)
∆v(S ∪ {k}) + ∆v(S) + ∆v({k}) = ∆v(S) + ∆v({k})
⇔ ∆v(S ∪ {k}) = 0.
Induction step: Assume that equivalence and equality in the first and last line of the
system above hold for all coalitions S ′ with s′ ≥ 1 (IH) and let s = s′ + 1 and k ∈ {i, j}.
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We get
v(S ∪ {k}) = v(S) + v({k})
⇔
(1)
∆v(S ∪ {k}) +
∑
R((S∪{k})
∆v(R) =
∑
R⊆S
∆v(R) + ∆v({k})
⇔
(IH)
∆v(S ∪ {k}) + ∆v({k}) +
∑
R⊆S
∆v(R) =
∑
R⊆S
∆v(R) + ∆v({k})
⇔ ∆v(S ∪ {k}) = 0.
7.2.3. Proof of theorem 5.3
I. Existence: By section 4 Shp satisfies E and D.
• P: Let v ∈ GN0 and i, j ∈ N such that i and j are weakly dependent in v. We have
Shpi (v) =
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
v({i})∑
k∈S v({k})
∆v(S) =
5.2
v({i}) +
∑
S⊆N,
{i,j}⊆S
v({i})∑
k∈S v({k})
∆v(S)
=
v({i})
v({j})v({j}) +
v({i})
v({j})
∑
S⊆N,
{i,j}⊆S
v({j})∑
k∈S v({k})
∆v(S)
=
5.2
v({i})
v({j})
∑
S⊆N,
S3j
v({j})∑
k∈S v({k})
∆v(S) =
v({i})
v({j})Sh
p
j(v).
•WA: Let v, w ∈ GN0 with w({i}) = c · v({i}) for all i ∈ N, c > 0. We have
Shpi (v) + Sh
p
i (w) =
(3)
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
v({i})∑
j∈S v({j})
∆v(S) +
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
w({i})∑
j∈S w({j})
∆w(S)
=
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
v({i})∑
j∈S v({j})
∆v(S) +
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
c · v({i})∑
j∈S c · v({j})
∆w(S)
=
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
v({i})∑
j∈S v({j})
[
∆v(S) + ∆w(S)
]
=
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
(1 + c)v({i})∑
j∈S(1 + c)v({j})
[
∆v(S) + ∆w(S)
]
=
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
v({i}) + w({i})∑
j∈S
[
v({j}) + w({j})]∆v+w(S) = Shpi (v + w).
II. Uniqueness: Let N ∈ N , n := |N |, v ∈ GN0 and ϕ a TU-value which satisfies all axioms
of theorem 5.3. To prove uniqueness, we will show that ϕ equals Shp.
For n = 1 ϕ equals Shp by E. Let now n ≥ 2. For each coalition S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅, we
define, corresponding to remark 7.1, a TU-game vS ∈ GN0 through a vector −→vS ∈ R2n−1
by assigning the coordinates of the related vector
−−→
∆vS ∈ R2n−1 in the entry of a coalition
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R ⊆ N, R 6= ∅, the dividend
∆vS(R) :=

v({j})
2n − 1 , if R = {j} for all j ∈ N,
∆v(S), if R = S, |S| ≥ 2,
0, otherwise.
So each vector −→vS ∈ R2n−1 gets in the coordinates of coalitions R ⊆ N, R 6= ∅, the entry
vS(R) =

∆v(S) +
∑
j∈R
v({j})
2n − 1 , if R ⊇ S, |S| ≥ 2,∑
j∈R
v({j})
2n − 1 , else.
(5)
We have
−→
∆v =
∑
S⊆N,
S 6=∅
−−→
∆vS and so by remark 7.1 v =
∑
S⊆N,
S 6=∅
vS.
By D we obtain
ϕi(vS) =

vS({i}) = v({i})
2n − 1 for all i ∈ N and |S| = 1, and
vS({i}) = v({i})
2n − 1 for all i ∈ N, i /∈ S, |S| ≥ 2.
(6)
By lemma 5.2 all players i ∈ S, |S| ≥ 2, are pairwise weakly dependent in vS. We get for
an arbitrary i ∈ S, |S| ≥ 2, and by vS(N) =
(5)
∆v(S) +
∑
j∈N
v({j})
2n − 1∑
j∈S ϕj(vS) =
(P)
∑
j∈S
vS({j})
vS({i})ϕi(vS) =
∑
j∈S
v({j})
v({i})ϕi(vS)
=
(E)
vS(N)−
∑
j∈N\S
ϕj(vS) =
(6)
∆v(S) +
∑
j∈S
v({j})
2n − 1
⇔ ϕi(vS) = v({i})∑
j∈S v({j})
∆v(S) +
v({i})
2n − 1 . (7)
So we have by (3), (6) and (7) for all S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅,
ϕi(vS) = Sh
p
i (vS) for all i ∈ N.
Shp and ϕ satisfy WA and it follows
ϕi(v) = Sh
p
i (v) for all i ∈ N.
7.2.4. Proof of proposition 5.4
⇒: We show WM implies WCSE: Let v and w two TU-games satisfying the hypotheses
of WCSE, i. e. for a coalition R ⊆ N, |R| ≥ 2, c ∈ R, we have
v(S) =
{
w(S) + c, if S ⊇ R,
w(S), if S + R,
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and let ϕ a value which obeys WM. By lemma 7.2 we have
∆v(S) =
{
∆w(R) + c, if S = R,
∆w(S), otherwise.
Thus we have for all i ∈ N\R ∆v(S ∪ {i}) = ∆w(S ∪ {i}) for all S ⊆ N\{i}. By
lemma 7.3 follows MCvi (S) = MC
w
i (S) for all S ⊆ N\{i}. So we can use WM and get
ϕi(v) = ϕi(w) for all i ∈ N\R and WCSE is satisfied.
⇐: We show WCSE implies WM: Let N ∈ N , i ∈ N, v, w ∈ GN two coalition functions
satisfying the hypothesis of WM, i. e. MCvi (S) = MC
w
i (S) for all S ⊆ N\{i} and
w({k}) = v({k}) for all k ∈ N and ϕ a value satisfying WCSE. Then by lemma 7.3 we
have ∆v(T ) = ∆w(T ) for all T ⊆ N, T 3 i. Let R = {Rj ⊆ N : ∆v(Rj) 6= ∆w(Rj)}
an indexed set of all subsets of N with different dividends in v and w, 1 ≤ j ≤ |R|. We
define inductively a sequence of coalition functions wj, 0 ≤ j ≤ |R|, by wj := w if j = 0,
and, if 1 ≤ j ≤ |R|,
∆wj(S) :=
{
∆wj−1(Rj) +
[
∆v(Rj)−∆wj−1(Rj)
]
, if S = Rj,
∆wj−1(S), if S ⊆ N, S 6= Rj.
Then we have w|R| = v and, by lemma 7.2 and WCSE, we get ϕi(wj) = ϕi(wj−1) for all
j, 1 ≤ j ≤ |R|, and therefore ϕi(v) = ϕi(w) and WM is satisfied.
7.2.5. Proof of theorem 5.5
I. Existence: By theorem 5.3 Shp satisfies E and P.
•WCSE: By lemma 7.2 we have for v and a coalition R from WCSE
∆v(S) =
{
∆w(R) + c, if S = R,
∆w(S), else
and get thus for all i ∈ N\R
Shpi (v) =
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
v({i})∑
j∈S v({j})
∆v(S) =
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
w({i})∑
j∈S w({j})
∆w(S) = Sh
p
i (w).
II. Uniqueness: Let N ∈ N , n := |N |, v ∈ GN0 and ϕ a TU-value which satisfies all axioms
of theorem 5.5. We will show that ϕ satisfies eq. (3).
For n = 1 eq. (3) is satisfied by E.
Let n ≥ 2. We use induction on the size r := |{R ⊆ N : R is active in v and |R| ≥ 2}|.
Initialisation: Let r = 0. By lemma 5.2 all players i, j ∈ N are pairwise weakly
dependent in v. We get for an arbitrary i ∈ N∑
j∈N
ϕj(v) =
(P)
∑
j∈N
v({j})
v({i})ϕi(v) =(E) v(N).
With v(N) =
∑
j∈N v({j}) follows ϕi(v) = v({i}) and eq. (3) holds to ϕ if r = 0.
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Induction step: Assume that eq. (3) holds to ϕ if r ≥ 0, r arbitrary, (IH) and let exactly
r + 1 coalitions Qk ⊆ N, |Qk| ≥ 2, 1 ≤ k ≤ r + 1, active in v. Let Q the intersection of
all such coalitions Qk
Q =
⋂
1≤k≤r+1
Qk.
We distinguish two cases: a: i ∈ N\Q and b: i ∈ Q.
a: Each player i ∈ N\Q is a member of at most r active coalitions Qk, |Qk| ≥ 2, and
v gets at least one active coalition Ri, |Ri| ≥ 2, i /∈ Ri. Hence exists a coalition function
wi ∈ GN0 , where all coalitions get the same dividend in wi as in v, except the coalition Ri,
which get the dividend ∆wi(Ri) = 0, and there is existing a scalar c ∈ R, c 6= 0, with
∆v(S) =
{
∆wi(Ri) + c, if S = Ri,
∆wi(S), else.
By lemma 7.2 and WCSE we get ϕi(v) = ϕi(wi) with i ∈ N\Ri and because there exists
for all i ∈ N\Q a such Ri we get ϕi(v) = ϕi(wi) for all i ∈ N\Q. All coalition functions
wi get at most r active coalitions with at least two players and by (IH) and eq. (3) follows
ϕi(v) = Sh
p
i (v) for all i ∈ N\Q. (8)
b: Each player j ∈ Q is a member of all r + 1 active coalitions Qk ⊆ N, |Qk| ≥ 2, 1 ≤
k ≤ r + 1, and therefore, by lemma 5.2, all players j ∈ Q are weakly dependent. By P
and E of ϕ and Shp we get for an arbitrary i ∈ Q∑
j∈Q
ϕj(v) =
(P)
∑
j∈Q
v({j})
v({i})ϕi(v) =(E)
(8)
v(N)−
∑
j∈N\Q
Shpj(v) =
(E)
∑
j∈Q
Shpj(v) =
(P)
∑
j∈Q
v({j})
v({i})Sh
p
i (v)
⇔ ϕi(v) = Shpi (v) and together with I. the proof is complete.
7.2.6. Proof of proposition 5.9
Let v ∈ GN0 , j ∈ N and (N j, vj) ∈ GNj a corresponding splitted player game to (N, v).
We point out that we have for all S ⊆ N\{j}, S 6= ∅, ∆vj(S) = ∆v(S), ∆vj(S ∪ {k, l}) =
∆v(S ∪ {j}) and ∆vj(S ∪ {k}) = ∆vj(S ∪ {`}) = 0. Then we get for all i ∈ N\{j}
Shpi (N, v) =
∑
R⊆N,
R3i
v({i})∑
m∈R v({m})
∆v(R)
=
∑
S⊆N\{j},
S3i
v({i})∑
m∈S v({m})
∆v(S) +
∑
S⊆N\{j},
S3i
v({i})∑
m∈S∪{j} v({m})
∆v(S ∪ {j})
=
∑
S⊆Nj\{k,`},
S3i
vj({i})∑
m∈S v
j({m})∆vj(S) +
∑
S⊆Nj\{k,`},
S3i
vj({i})∑
m∈S∪{k,`} v
j({m})∆vj(S ∪ {k, `})
=
∑
R⊆Nj,
R3i
vj({i})∑
m∈R v
j({m})∆vj(R) = Sh
p
i (N
j, vj).
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7.2.7. Proof of lemma 5.10
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n}, |N | ≥ 2, v ∈ GN0 , ϕ a TU-value which satisfies E and PS for all
v ∈ GN0 and, w.l.o.g., player 1 and player 2 symmetric in v. If we split player 1 according
to PS into two new players, player n+ 1 and player n+ 2, N1 = {2, 3, ..., n, n+ 1, n+ 2},
we have
ϕ2(N
1, v1) = ϕ2(N, v), (9)
and, if we split player 2 according to PS into the same players as before, player n+ 1 and
player n+ 2, instead, N2 = {1, 3, 4, ..., n, n+ 1, n+ 2}, we have
ϕ1(N
2, v2) = ϕ1(N, v), (10)
where we choose v2({n+ 1}) := v1({n+ 1}) and v2({n+ 2}) := v1({n+ 2}).
In the same manner we split now in game (N1, v1) player 2 into two new players, player
n + 3 and player n + 4, and analogous in game (N2, v2) player 1 into the same players
as before, player n + 3 and player n + 4, and choose v2
1
({n + 3}) := v12({n + 3}) and
v2
1
({n+ 4}) := v12({n+ 4}). We have N12 = N21 = {3, 4, ..., n, n+ 1, n+ 2, n+ 3, n+ 4}
and v1
2
= v2
1
and get by E, according to remark 5.7,
ϕn+3
(
N1
2
, v1
2
)
+ ϕn+4
(
N1
2
, v1
2
)
= ϕ2(N
1, v1) =
(9)
ϕ2(N, v),
ϕn+3
(
N2
1
, v2
1
)
+ ϕn+4
(
N2
1
, v2
1
)
= ϕ1(N
2, v2) =
(10)
ϕ1(N, v)
and hence ϕ1(N, v) = ϕ2(N, v) and S is shown.
7.2.8. Proof of lemma 5.11
Let N ∈ N , |N | ≥ 2, v ∈ GN0Q a TU-game and, w.l.o.g., player i, j ∈ N weakly dependent
in v and let ϕ a TU-value, which satisfies E and PS for all v ∈ GN0Q and therefore, by lemma
5.10, also S. Due to v({i}), v({j}) ∈ Q++ the worths of singletons v({k}), k ∈ {i, j}, can
be written as a fraction
v({k}) = pk
qk
with pk, qk ∈ N.
We choose a main denominator q of these two fractions by q := qiqj. With zi := piqj and
zj := pjqi we get
v({i}) = zi
q
and v({j}) = zj
q
. (11)
Now we define a player set N ′ and a coalition function v′ by ”splitting” each player
k ∈ {i, j} into zk players k1 to kzk so that we have N ′ = (N\{i, j}) ∪ {im : 1 ≤ m ≤
zi} ∪ {jm : 1 ≤ m ≤ zj}. Each player km ∈ N ′\(N\{i, j}), 1 ≤ m ≤ zk, get a singleton
worth v′({km}) = 1q for k ∈ {i, j}, synonymous with
v′({`}) = 1
q
for all ` ∈ N ′\(N\{i, j}),
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where |N ′\(N\{i, j})| = zi + zj and v({k}) =
∑
1≤m≤zk v
′({km}), k ∈ {i, j}. We define
v′(R′) := v(R) for all R′ = R\{i, j}∪N ′\(N\{i, j}), R ⊆ N, {i, j} ⊆ R and v′(S) := v(S)
for all S ⊆ N ′ with S ⊆ N . All other coalitions T ⊆ N ′ are defined as not active in v′.
Applying splitting 5.3 (repeatedly) to v, ϕ and the two players i, j ∈ N we can get the
coalition function v′ defined just before and by remark 5.7 we have
ϕk(N, v) =
∑
1≤m≤zk
ϕkm(N
′, v′) for k ∈ {i, j}. (12)
All players ` ∈ N ′\(N\{i, j}) are symmetric in v′ and hence follows by S
ϕ`(N
′, v′) =
ϕi(N, v) + ϕj(N, v)
zi + zj
for ` ∈ N ′\(N\{i, j}).
We get
ϕk(N, v) =
(12)
∑
1≤m≤zk
ϕkm(N
′, v′) =
zk
zi + zj
[
ϕi(N, v) + ϕj(N, v)
]
for k ∈ {i, j}.
It follows
ϕi(N, v) =
zi
zj
ϕj(N, v) =
(11)
v({i})
v({j})ϕj(N, v)
and P is shown.
7.3. Logical independence
Finally, we want to show the independence of the axioms used in the characterizations.
Remark 7.4. Let v ∈ GN0 , N ∈ N . The axioms in theorem 5.3/corollary 5.13 are logically
independent:
• E: The TU-value ϕ defined by
ϕi(v) = v({i}) + 2 ·
∑
S⊆N,
S3i, S 6={i}
v({i})∑
j∈S v({j})
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N
satisfies D, P/PS and WA but not E.
• D: The proportional rule pi (Moriarity 1975), given by
pii(v) =
v({i})∑
j∈N v({j})
v(N) for all i ∈ N (13)
satisfies E, P/PS and WA, but not D.
• P/PS: Sh satisfies E, D and WA but not P/PS.
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• WA: The TU-value ϕ defined for all i ∈ N by
ϕi(v) =

v({i}), if i is a dummy player,
v({i})∑
j∈N,
j is no dummy
v({j})
[
v(N)−∑ j∈N,
j is a dummy
v({j})
]
, else,
satisfies E, D and P/PS but not WA.
Remark 7.5. Let v ∈ GN0 , N ∈ N . The axioms in theorem 5.5/corollary 5.12 are logically
independent:
• E: The TU-value ϕ defined for all i ∈ N by
ϕi(v) =
{
0, if |N | = 1,
Shpi (v), else,
satisfies P/PS and WCSE but not E.
• P/PS: Sh satisfies E and WCSE but not P/PS.
• WCSE: The proportional rule pi (eq. (13)) satisfies E and P/PS but not WCSE.
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